Introduction
In this paper we consider settings in which there is one seller of an indivisible object and many potential buyers. The seller can choose to conduct either a first or second price sealed bid auction to allocate the object. The value of the object to a buyer is an increasing function of some unobservable investment, the level of which is chosen by the buyer before submitting a bid. We demonstrate that the choices of the buyers depend upon the type of auction chosen by the seller. If the seller runs a sealed bid second price auction, the equilibrium involves asymmetric investments: only one buyer invests, and this buyer chooses the efficient level of investment and wins the object. If the seller chooses a sealed bid first price auction, a symmetric, mixed strategy, inefficient equilibrium emerges. The seller prefers the latter outcome, while the buyers prefer the former. Thus, if the seller can choose the type of auction to hold, in the resulting equilibrium net expected surplus will not be maximized.
This result is relevant for several economic environments where valuations of objects are endogenous.
In the case of government procurement of goods and services, the government is a seller of procurement contracts, which firms buy. Firms can direct research and development efforts to lower production costs, and hence increase the return obtainable from a given contract. '
Local governments considering bidding for large-scale industrial investment in their jurisdictions can invest in local infrastructure.
' In both cases the seller's preferred auction induces levels of investment which are inefficient, although the object is sold to the more efficient buyer.
The model
Let xi denote the level of investment chosen by buyer i, i = A, B. For convenience, we assume that one unit of investment yields one unit of gross surplus, so xi will also denote the value produced by buyer i when the buyer has invested this amount. We assume the buyers are initially identical. Investment is produced according to an increasing, strictly convex cost function y(x,); this cost function is common to both buyers. Let b, denote the bid submitted by buyer i, i = A,B; ~i(-Y,) = 7i(bA, b,, xi), the surplus retained by buyer i; and s*, the efficient level of investment defined by y'(s*) = 1. Since only one of the buyers will be chosen, without loss of generality we let A be the winning buyer.
Second price or oral auction
If the seller holds an oral auction, the actual levels of the x's will be revealed during the auction, s and the expected surplus accruing to buyer A is
The buyer's choice of investment is then either x2 =x *, or xz = 0, since
(1) Buyer B's optimal strategy can be derived in a similar fashion. These results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The oral auction generates an asymmetric pllre strategy equilibrium in which one buyer chooses the efficient leL-el of incestment, and wins the auction, while the other buyer incests nothing.
A sealed bid second price auction would yield the same result in this game. Therefore no pure strategy equilibrium exists. 0
Although there is no pure strategy equilibrium to the investment game in the first price sealed bid auction, the next lemma proves the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Since the socially efficient outcome has one buyer choosing the optimal level of investment, and the other choosing zero, and equilibrium in which buyers randomize their choices of investment is not efficient. =F(E(x))
=F (+$).
Since y'(x*) = 1, F(B(x*)) = F(x* -y(x*))= 1, and s ranges from 0 to x*. The cdf of x is y'(x); to see this, note that Prob(x<.?)=Prob(B(x)<B(,?))=F(B(s))=y'(x).
•J
Lemmas 1 and 3 demonstrate that the second price auction yields results which are superior if the goal is to maximize expected surplus. However, if the seller can choose which auction to run. it may choose the one which maximizes its expected return. The conflict between the social optimum and the seller's goal is demonstrated in Lemma 4.
Lemma 3. The seller5 surplus under the first price sealed bid auction exceeds that obtainable rrith a second price auction.
Proof.
In the second price auction, one'buyer chooses zero investment. Since the seller's return cannot exceed the maximum of its reservation price or the bid from the losing buyer, all of the surplus generated by investment accrues to the winning buyer. In the first price auction, each buyer's expected equilibrium pay-off is zero. Since the equilibrium is symmetric,
The term in brackets must be strictly positive for any x for which a buyer submits a positive bid. All of this surplus is captured by the seller. 0
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that when bidders' valuations are endogenous and unobservable, the type of auction chosen has efficiency effects: there is a conflict between maximizing the social surplus and maximizing the expected pay-off to the seller of the good being auctioned. In the case of government contracting, these results imply that a government agency which commits to an auction form which maximizes its expected return (rather than the social surplus) will choose a buyer efficiently given the pre-determined investments, but will induce an inefficient level of investment on the part of firms interested in winning the contract. In the case of local governments engaged in bidding wars for plants, similar results apply: although the firm's location decision will be efficient, given the levels of infrastructure chosen by the bidding regions, the regional governments will not choose the efficient levels of investment when the firm can choose (and commit to) the auction form.
